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TORTS
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
In Kelton v. District of Columbia' the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals construed the District's waiver of sovereign immunity statute2 to rule
that the six month period within which the District must be notified of a
suit against it begins to run from the time "when the plaintiff knows or
through the exercise of due diligence should have known of the injury."3
The plaintiff had undergone a Caesarean section in October, 1967, while
a patient at D.C. General Hospital, but did not learn until March 26, 1976
that she might have undergone an unauthorized tubal ligation as well. The
suspicion that the procedure was neither authorized nor required by a
medical emergency was confirmed by medical records on September 15,
1976; the District was notified on November 18, 1976; the suit was filed
against the District on March 21, 1977. The court declined to apply the
rule of Bridgford v. United States, a Fourth Circuit case, that the notifica-
tion period doesn't begin to run "until a claimant has had a reasonable
opportunity to discover all of the essential elements of a possible cause of
action."4 The court found that the plaintiff's March 26 discovery gave her
sufficient knowledge of an actionable injury to commence the running of
the six month period. The plaintiffs failure to notify the District of her
intention to sue until November 18 thus barred her claim.
In order to determine whether a three year statute of limitations5 had
run, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in Hunt
1. 413 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1980).
2. D.C. CODE § 12-309 (1973) provides in pertinent part:
An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliqui-
dated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or
damage was sustained, the claimant ... has given notice in writing to the Commis-
sioner of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or
damage (emphasis added).
3. 413 A.2d at 921 quoting Bums v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614, 617 (D.C. 1979).
( 4. Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978, 981-82 (4th Cir. 1977) (construing the
federal waiver of immunity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976)), discussed in 413 A.2d at 921
n.4. Cf United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122-24 (1979) (specified action that should
be taken once malpractice is suspected).
5. D.C. CODE § 12-301 (1973) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, actions for the following pur-
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v. Bittman 6, attempted to define the point at which a cause of action ac-
crues in a legal malpractice claim.7
The plaintiff pled guilty to six counts of burglary, conspiracy, and illegal
wiretapping in January, 1973, and was sentenced and incarcerated on
March 23, 1973. Because of a possible conflict of interest, the defendant
withdrew as plaintiff's counsel in August, 1973. The plaintiff was released
from prison for a time while he sought to withdraw his guilty plea. His
appeal was denied in February, 1975. He was returned to prison on April
25, 1975, was released on February 23, 1977, and filed his malpractice suit
on September 30, 1977. In response to the defendant's motion to dismiss
because the statute had run, the plaintiff argued that his "injury" had oc-
curred on either February 25, 1975, or from April 25, 1975 to February 23,
1977. The court agreed that a cause of action "accrues" when the plaintiff
suffers injury, but ruled that this plaintiffs injury occurred no later than
March 23, 1973, when he was sentenced and first imprisoned. Thus, his
claim was barred. Unfortunately, the court did little to establish a general
standard for determining when a cause of action accrues in tort.
In response to the plaintiff's alternative contention that the defendant's
fraudulent concealment of his malpractice tolled the statute long enough
past March 23, 1973, and saved the action, the court determined that the
plaintiff had knowledge, prior to October 1, 1974, of every factual aspect of
the defendant's acts of malpractice. He had not been precluded from filing
suit in time to avoid the running of the statute.'
In Shulman v. Miskell,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that, in a suit for malicious prosecution, the
one-year statute of limitations" does not begin to run until all the ele-
ments of the cause of action exist. In the District", as in other jurisdic-
poses may not be brought after the expiration of the period specified below from
the time the right to maintain the action accrues:
(8) for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed--3 years. . . (em-
phasis added).
6. 482 F. Supp. 1017 (D.D.C. 1980).
7. The court cited Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d
261 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968), and Weisberg v. Williams, Connolly
& Califano, 390 A.2d 992 (D.C. 1978), but Fort Meyers says no more than that the "injury
rule" applies, 381 F.2d at 262, and Weisberg expressly declined to answer "the question of
when the legal malpractice claim . . . in that case accrued," 482 F. Supp. at 1021.
8. 482 F. Supp. at 1022-25.
9. 626 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
10. D.C. CODE § 12-301(4) (1973).




tions' 2, an essential element of malicious prosecution is the disposition of
the underlying civil or criminal action in the defendant's favor. The de-
fendant in Shulman argued that the statute had run from the date the un-
derlying suit was originally filed. The court responded that, if the
underlying suit terminated more than a year after filing, the attendant ma-
licious prosecution suit would be barred by the statute before it ever le-
gally accrued. Also, if a malicious prosecution suit were filed prior to
termination of the underlying suit, in order to avoid possible future limita-
tions problems, it would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. 3 The court thus followed the great
majority of jurisdictions' 4 in holding that the statute of limitations in a
malicious prosecution suit runs from the date the underlying cause of ac-
tion is resolved in the defendant's favor.
II. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duty
In Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc. ,"5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that a consultant engineering firm (Bech-
tel), under contract to provide safety engineering services to the Washing-
ton Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in the construction of the
Washington Metro system, owed a duty to protect an employee of a con-
tractor performing Metro work under a separate Metro contract. The
plaintiff alleged that he suffered from silicosis as a result of working in an
atmosphere heavily laden with silica dust. He sued Bechtel for failing to
enforce adequate safety standards at the site. His suit was dismissed by the
district court primarily because of the absence of contractual privity be-
tween the employee and Bechtel. 6 The court of appeals remanded for
trial, stressing that the case was grounded in tort, not contract.'7 The court
found that Bechtel's duty to the employee originated from two "not en-
tirely distinct" sources.' 8 The first was contractually initiated and ex-
tended to workers who, like the plaintiff, were foreseeable victims of the
dangers that Bechtel was under a contractual duty to rectify. 9 The second
was based on the "special relationship" between Bechtel and the employee
12. See cases cited in 52 AM. JUR. 2D, Malicious Prosecution, § 29 n.6.
13. 626 F.2d at 175.
14. See id and cases cited therein.
15. 631 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
16. Id at 995-96.
17. Id at 997-1002.
18. Id at 1002.
19. Id at 1001-02.
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that "transcended" Bechtel's contractual status: Bechtel was the em-
ployee's "coparticipant in a dangerous enterprise" and possessed the
unique skill and authority to protect the employee on the job site.2"
In Teasley v. United States,2 the plaintiff sought damages from a mental
hospital for injuries sustained when she was raped. She alleged that the
hospital negligently failed to show at a judicial hospitalization hearing that
her assailant, if not hospitalized, would pose a danger to himself and
others. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed a summary judgment order in favor of the hospital on the
ground that a hospital's duty in a hospitalization hearing is limited to dis-
closing to the Mental Health Commission the material facts known to it
concerning the subject patient. The ultimate responsibility for the decision
to hospitalize the patient is the Commission's.22 The hospital had dis-
closed to the Commission all the evidence it had; it "could do no more
than alert the Commission to the possibility of danger."23 The court thus
distinguished Hicks v. United States,24 where a mental hospital was found
liable for the death of a woman shot by her husband. In Hicks, the hospi-
tal had failed to provide the Commission with information it possessed
concerning the husband's dangerous mental disorder; the husband com-
mitted his crime shortly after being released.
In Morowitz v. Marvel,25 a physician sued an attorney for allegedly pro-
fessional negligence in filing a frivolous medical malpractice suit against
him. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the
suit on several grounds. First, the court noted that the privity of contract
doctrine generally bars a professional negligence suit brought by an oppos-
ing party against adverse counsel.26 Second, the adverse party was not an
intended beneficiary of the adverse counsel's legal services. 27 Finally, the
court stated that imposing a duty upon an attorney to an adverse party
would violate public policy. Conflicts of interest would be created between
20. Id. at 1002 (citing Sweet, Site Architects and Construction Workers: Brothers and
Keepers or Strangers?, 28 EMORY L.J. 291, 327 n.24 (1979)).
21. 109 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 209 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 5, 1981).
22. See D.C. CODE §§ 21-542, -544 (1973).
23. 109 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 213.
24. 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
25. 423 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1980).
26. Id at 199 (citing National Savings Bank of D.C. v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879)).
27. Id at 199-200 (citing Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 375 (1976); Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1973), af 'd
mem., 43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (App. Div. 1974)).
[Vol. 30:787
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his client and himself,2" with a consequent inhibition of free access to the
courts.
2 9
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals expanded the potential
scope of a landlord's duty to his tenants in Graham v. M & J Corp. .30 The
plaintiffs, tenants in an apartment building in a high-crime section of the
city, sued their landlord for damages resulting from a fire deliberately set
in the hallway of the building by one tenant's former paramour. The trial
court found that the landlord had no duty as a matter of law and granted
him summary judgment. The appeals court reversed and remanded for
trial, stating that "[f]oreseeability is the key element in establishing the
landlord's duty."'" Thus, the court concluded, the trier of fact-in this
case the jury-must decide whether, under all the circumstances, a crimi-
nal assault by arson perpetrated by a tenant's rejected lover was suffi-
ciently "probable and predictable" to impose a duty upon the landlord to
take protective measures.32
Judge Nebeker dissented on procedural, substantive, and policy
grounds. He argued that, "particularly. . . where negligence law is ex-
panding in response to changing social conditions. . . the question of duty
is better left to the discretion and judgment of the court than to an often
bewildered jury."'33 He emphasized that precedent requires the landlord to
be put on actual notice of prior criminal activity in the building before he
has a duty to protect tenants from criminal assault. There was no such
notice here.3" Finally, he warned that the "unfettered jury discretion" al-
28. Id at 199-200 (citing Berlin v. Nathan, 64 IUl. App. 3d 940, 952, 381 N.E.2d 1367,
1376 (1978)).
29. Id at 200 (citing Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 335, 375 N.E.2d 480, 485
(1975); Drago v. Buonagurio, 89 Misc. 2d 171, 391 N.Y.S.2d 61, 63 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd, 61
A.D.2d 282, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250 (App. Div. 1978), original order reinstated, mem., 46 N.Y.2d
778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978)).
30. 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1980).
31. Id at 105.
32. Id (citing the familiar trilogy of Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977); Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252
A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969)). See also Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 325 (D.C. 1981)
(duty to protect from criminal assault arises only where the particular crime of assault is
foreseeable).
33. Id at 108 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
34. Id Judge Nebeker correctly stated that a high incidence of crime in the area is
insufficient notice to impose such a duty on the landlord. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Davis Constr. Co., 350 A.2d 751 (D.C. 1976). But he minimized, if not ignored,
evidence that tenants had repeatedly complained about a broken outer door that had led to
acts of vandalism in the common hallway. 424 A.2d at 104, 106. He insisted that "the
landlord must have had notice of prior 'like' crimes before imposing liability." Id at 107
(Nebeker, J., dissenting).
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lowed by the majority's holding would serve as a further disincentive to
invest in an already strained rental housing market. 3
B. Breach
In Waldon v. Covington,36 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, various faculty
members of the University of the District of Columbia, in a suit brought
by the widow of a former professor who died of a heart attack allegedly
caused by the defendants' intentional infliction of extreme emotional dis-
tress. The suit was brought under the survival
37 and the wrongful death 31
statutes. The court of appeals did not apply the lower court's proximate
cause analysis.39 It focused instead on the defendants' lack of intent. The
applicable test is whether the defendants "purposely caused a disturbance
of another's mental or emotional tranquility of so acute a nature that
harmful physical consequences might be not unlikely to result."'  In Wal-
don, the defendants failed to give the decedent keys to a laboratory, to
notify him of departmental meetings, or to give him teaching assignments
within his specialty. Such acts were not "beyond all the bounds of de-
cency" 4' so as to permit an inference of intent to inflict extreme emotional
distress.42
In Copeland v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. ,43 a train lacking head-
lights that met the statutory luminosity requirement" struck a trespasser at
night.45 The trespasser alleged that the railroad breached its duty of ordi-
nary care and had proximately caused his injuries. The District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals upheld a summary judgment in the railroad's favor.
It adopted the generally accepted standard that an owner of real property
only owes a duty of ordinary care to those trespassers whose presence on
35. Id at 108 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
36. 415 A.2d 1070 (D.C. 1980).
37. D.C. CODE § 12-101 (1973).
38. D.C. CODE § 16-2701 (1973).
39. 415 A.2d at 1075-76 n.18.
40. Id at 1077 (quoting Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.
1939)). It should be remembered that actual physical injury or impact is required only in
cases of negligent infliction of extreme emotional distress. See Parrish v. United States, 375
F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Perry v. Capital Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 280 U.S. 577 (1929).
41. 415 A.2d at 1076.
42. Id at 1077-78.
43. 416 A.2d I (D.C. 1980).
44. Id at 2 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 230.231 (1977)).
45. See id at 2-3.
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his property is known or reasonably foreseeable.46 The engineer's conduct
in immediately applying the train's brakes and horn after discovering the
plaintiff on the tracks was clearly an exercise of ordinary care. Plaintiffs
presence on the tracks was not reasonably foreseeable,47 and defendant
therefore owed plaintiff nothing more than the duty customarily owed to
the undiscovered trespasser: to refrain from wanton and willful miscon-
duct.4 8 The court held the railroad not liable because the wanton and will-
ful standard of liability was not satisfied. The inadequacy of the train's
headlights was not intentional and the unforeseeability of plaintiffs pres-
ence on the tracks made it unlikely that someone would be injured merely
because the lights were dim.
C Causation
In Elam v. Ethical Prescrotion Pharmacy, Inc. , the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals held that causation in an automobile accident is gen-
erally a jury question and that the plaintiff, here the favored motorist in a
controlled intersection, was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law
for failing to look down the intersecting street before proceeding into the
intersection. The court distinguished cases5" that held favored motorists
contributorily negligent as a matter of law "for failing to see a vehicle that
already had entered an intersection and was clearly visible in the oncom-
ing lanes of traffic,"'" because in Elam the defendant driver was unfavored
and ran a stop sign.
In Lacy v. District of Columbia,52 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals approved the giving of a "substantial factor" jury instruction 53 in a
case involving the liability of school officials for an intervening criminal
act by an employee in sexually assaulting a student at the school. The
school officials were found not liable.54 The court divided the concept of
46. Id at 3.
47. Id at 4.
48. Id at 3.
49. 422 A.2d 1288 (D.C. 1980).
50. See Frager v. Pecot, 327 A.2d 306 (D.C. 1974); D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Harris,
284 A.2d 277 (D.C. 1971).
51. 422 A.2d at 1291.
52. 424 A.2d 317 (D.C. 1981).
53. The instruction read:
However in order to find the defendants school officials liable for the sexual as-
saults ..., you must first find that it was more likely than not that the conduct of
the defendants was a substantial factor in the assaults. A mere possibility of such
causation is not enough and if the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, you
should find for the defendants. Id at 318, 325.
54. See Lacy v. District of Columbia, 408 A.2d 985 (D.C. 1980).
Torts
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proximate cause into a "cause-in-fact (causation) element and a policy ele-
ment.""5 To the extent that the cause-in-fact element in cases of concur-
rent cause is a difficult issue for a jury to confront, the court suggested that
the substantial factor instruction might be of considerable assistance.5 6
In his dissent, Judge Kern argued persuasively that the verdict in favor
of the school officials should be overturned.17 He stated that, regardless of
the existence of concurrent causes, each defendant's liability for proxi-
mately causing the plaintiff's injuries must be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence. The unavoidable effect of giving the "substantial factor"
instruction was to add something to that standard of proof and increase the
plaintiff's burden.
III. DEFAMATION
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held, in Global Van Lines,
Inc. v. Kleinow,"8 that a writ of attachment served on the plaintiff's em-
ployer following an improperly entered default judgment against the
plaintiff does not provide grounds for a defamation action by the plaintiff
against his judgment creditor. The writ was "published" not by the judg-
ment creditor, but by the issuing court, and thus the critical element of
publication was lacking.59 The court also noted in dictum that the defenses
of truth and privilege barred the suit from the outset.6 °
The Church of Scientology, in Church of Scientology of California v. Fo-
ley ,61 sued certain federal employees for "negligent deprivation of consti-
tutional rights" arising out of the defendants' roles in the preparation and
dissemination of an allegedly false memorandum about the Church. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the
case, finding that the cause of action sounded in defamation and was
barred by the District's one-year statute of limitations. 6  The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that, to
the extent the complaint alleged defamation it was barred, but the court
reversed because, read broadly, the complaint sounded in negligence and
55. 424 A.2d at 325.
56. See Graham v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (approving the use of a
"substantial factor" instruction in the District of Columbia).
57. 424 A.2d at 326 (Kern, J., dissenting).
58. 411 A.2d 62 (D.C. 1980).
59. Id at 64.
60. The writ was true because it stated the fact that a default judgment had been en-
tered; it was privileged by the absolute privilege accorded to statements made by a court. Id
61. 108 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 501 (D.D.C. March 19, 1980).
62. See D.C. CODE § 12-301 (1973).
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was therefore subject to the three-year statute. While expressly declining
to decide whether the Church had a cause of action, the court recognized
that the government has a general duty of care, that this duty applies to the
compilation and maintenance of files and memoranda, and that, on re-
mand, the district court may decide whether that duty encompasses the
preparation of the subject memorandum.
63
Judge Wilkey dissented stating that the District's statute of limitations
focuses on the "purpose" of the action, and that the purpose of the
Church's complaint was "to redress the injury that [it] allegedly sustained
to its reputation as a result of the dissemination of false information to third
parties."'  He would thus find the suit sounding only in defamation and
barred by the one-year statute.
IV. MISREPRESENTATION
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia empha-
sized, in Rothenberg v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. ,65 that a false represen-
tation must be of a material fact in order to sustain a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation. A moving company was unable to pick up and move
the plaintiffs belongings at a promised time because it had overbooked its
orders. The plaintiff had not been advised previously of this overbooking
policy, but was given two weeks' notice by the moving company of its in-
ability to meet its obligations. The plaintiff sued the mover for fraudulent
misrepresentation, relying primarily on the authority of Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines.66 The court distinguished Nader by finding that, although the
plaintiff there had his reservation on an airplane cancelled because of an
unannounced overbooking policy, the misrepresentation in that case was
material because receipt of cancellation notice just five minutes before de-
parture contravened plaintiffs "generalized expectations" of commercial
flight.67 The misrepresentation in Rothenberg was immaterial.68
63. 108 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 505-06.
64. Id at 506 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
65. 495 F. Supp. 399 (D.D.C. 1980).
66. 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S.
290 (1976), on remand, 445 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1978).
67. 495 F. Supp. at 406.
68. Id The plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages was also dismissed. Id at 407. The
defendant's advance notice to the plaintiff constituted less a showing of malice than "consid-
eration for its disappointed customer." Id at 408.
Torts
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V. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In Russell v. GA.F Corp. ,69 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
outlined standards for determining a manufacturer's liability for failure to
warn of foreseeable danger in the use of its product. The plaintiff was
injured when he fell through a corrugated asbestos sheet that shattered as
he walked across it. The manufacturer had enclosed a booklet in each
bundle of sheets explaining that planks and grids should be used to give
support to the sheets. The individual sheets, however, displayed no label
indicating the danger of failing to provide such support. The trial court
granted a directed verdict in the manufacturer's favor, finding no evidence
of a "defect" in the sheets at the time they left the manufacturer's hands.
The court of appeals disagreed with the lower court's analysis and re-
versed. It held that, in cases alleging either negligence or strict liability for
failure to warn of danger, evidence of a defect is irrelevant: "a product can
be perfectly made and still require directions or warnings in proper use in
order to be safe."7 ° As a result, the proper threshold inquiry, assuming a
danger serious enough to create a duty to warn exists,7 ' is whether the
warning actually provided was adequate.72 The court adopted the Re-
statement's adequacy-of-warning test, which entails consideration of four
different factors: "(1) the risk of injury; (2) the seriousness of harm which
might result; (3) the practicality and expense of placing a warning directly
on the product; and (4) the reliability of the middleman as the conduit of
the warning."73 Because of the trial court's inappropriate "defect" analy-
sis, the jury was improperly prevented from considering those factors. The
case was remanded.
In another labelling case, Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc. ,7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sought
to remove all doubt about the validity of a strict liability cause of action in
the District. Although recognizing that "[n]o District of Columbia court
has held a defendant liable for a product defect solely on the basis of a
69. 422 A.2d 989 (D.C. 1980).
70. Id at 991.
71. Here, the evidence showed that the manufacturer knew that it was common practice
for workers to walk on the asbestos sheets, id at 994, and knew or should have known that
the sheets would not support a person's weight if they developed a hairline crack or became
wet. Id at 992.
72. Thus, even in strict liability cases involving warnings and instructions, the thresh-
hold issue is: "Was there a negligent failure to warn?" See id. at 991 n.* (emphasis added).
73. Id at 992 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment n (1965)).
See also Griggs v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 858 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 865 (1975).
74. 109 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 113 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 1981).
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strict liability claim sounding in tort,"" the court nevertheless found im-
plicit approval for such a claim in numerous recent cases from the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals. 76 The Young case involved alleged inade-
quate labelling, thus requiring the plaintiff to sustain the preliminary bur-
den of showing the manufacturer's negligence in labelling the product."
As a result, a jury instruction was necessary to the effect that contributory
negligence is not a defense.7 8 Because the trial judge declined to recognize
the validity of a strict liability cause of action, no such instruction was
given. The jury was thereby allowed to find both sides at fault, and thus
the verdict was for the defendant. The appellate court reversed and re-
manded.
VI. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held, in Riley v. United States Industries/Federal Sheet Metal, Inc. ,7 that
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 80 accords an
injured claimant a rebuttable presumption that his injury arose out of and
in the course of employment and, without sufficient evidence to the con-
trary, the injury is covered by the Act.8" In Riley, the claimant was denied
disability benefits when an administrative law judge and the Benefits Re-
view Board found that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that he
had sustained an accident at work. The court reversed and remanded,
stating that the finding "that no accident had in fact occurred, is . . . not
responsive to the issue properly presented for resolution."82 Because the
claimant had clearly suffered an "injury, 83 the only issue to be resolved
was whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. On
that issue, the claimant was entitled to the statutory presumption that the
75. Id at 118.
76. See, e.g., Russell v. G.A.F. Corp., 422 A.2d 989 (D.C. 1980); Berman v. Watergate
West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978); Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807
(D.C. 1970). See also Stewart v. Ford Motor Co., 553 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
77. See note 62 supra.
78. 109 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 118. See also Russell v. G.A.F. Corp., 422 A.2d at 991
n.*.
79. 627 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
80. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et. seq. (1976), made applicable to the District of Columbia by
D.C. CODE §§ 36-501 to -502 (1973).
81. See 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1976).
82. 627 F.2d at 459.
83. The claimant, who had an arthritic neck, woke up with severe pain the morning
after he had allegedly struck his neck and shoulders on an overhead obstruction while work-
ing. See id at 457.
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injury was "employment-bred. 84 The court concluded that, in attaching
inappropriate significance to the occurrence of an "accident," 8 5 the admin-
istrative law judge and the Board improperly failed to grant the claimant
the right to that presumption.
In Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp. ,81 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided several questions relat-
ing to the calculation of the amount of benefits paid under the Act. First,
the court held that "where . . . two injuries befall an employee, the em-
ployee's earning capacity during the time preceding the second injury must
be the basis of computing benefits attributable to the second injury."87
Thus, a claimant's diminished earnings following his initial, partially disa-
bling injury are the basis for determining his benefits following a later,
permanently disabling injury. Second, the court softened its first ruling by
upholding the propriety of concurrent awards for both the permanent-par-
tial disability of the claimant's initial injury (a stroke) and the permanent-
total disability of his second injury (pulmonary emboli and phlebitis).
8
Because the claimant's permanent-total award was based on the dimin-
ished income he received after the first injury, "logic and fairness" re-
quired that the compensation for lost earnings represented by the first,
permanent-partial award be continued concurrently with the permanent-
total award.s9 Third, the court gave retroactive effect to an amendment to
the Act,9" enacted after the claimant was injured, that repeals a $24,000
ceiling on aggregate payments of permanent-partial disability benefits.
The court thus reversed the Board's order that such benefits cease when a
total of $24,000 has been paid.9" Finally, the Court ruled that, in calculat-
ing a claimant's average weekly wages, an administrative law judge need
not apply mechanically the statutory formula of one fifty-second part of
84. See id at 458 (citing J.V. Vozzolo, Inc. v. Britton, 377 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir.
1967)).
85. Cf. Swinton v. J. Frank Kelly, Inc., 554 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
820 (1976) (mental breakdown suffered as cumulative result of claimant's years of service);
see also Mitchell v. Woodworth, 449 F.2d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Butler v. District Parking
Mgmt Co., 363 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
86. 628 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 281 (1980).
87. Id at 90 (construing 33 U.S.C. § 910 (1976), which awards benefits based on the
employee's average weekly wage "at the time of the inuyry") (emphasis added by the court).
88. Id at 91.
89. Id
90. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 5(e), 86 Stat. 125 (repealing 33 U.S.C. § 914(m) (1970)).
91. 628 F.2d at 94. Accord, Davis v. United States Dep't of Labor, 109 DAILY WASH. L.
RFP. 45 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 1981).
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the claimant's average yearly wages. 92 Rather, where the claimant "dem-
onstrates a progressive increase (or decrease) in earnings in the year imme-
diately preceding an injury," the administrative law judge may weigh the
most recent weeks' wages more heavily.
93
John Egan
92. Cf 33 U.S.C. § 910(2)(d) (1976).
93. 628 F.2d at 95-96.
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